Background. In January 2008, a long-term acute care hospital (LTACH) in New Mexico reported a cluster of severe group A Streptococcus (GAS) infections.
Methods. We defined a case as illness in a patient in the LTACH from 1 October 2007 through 3 February 2008 from whom GAS was isolated from a usually sterile site or with illness consistent with GAS infection and GAS isolated from a nonsterile site. To identify carriers, we swabbed the oropharynx and skin lesions of patients and staff. We observed facility procedures to assess possible transmission routes and adherence to infection control practices. We also conducted a case-control study to identify risk factors for infection with use of asymptomatic patients who were noncarriers as control subjects.
Results. We identified 11 case patients and 11 carriers (8 patients and 3 staff). No carriers became case patients. Significant risk factors for infection in univariate analysis included sharing a room with an infected or colonized patient (6 [55%] of 11 case patients vs 3 [8%] of 39 control subjects), undergoing wound debridement (64% vs 13%), and receiving negative pressure wound therapy (73% vs 33%). Having an infected or colonized roommate remained associated with case patients in multivariable analysis (odds ratio, 15.3; 95% confidence interval, 2.5-110.9). Suboptimal infection control practices were widespread.
Conclusions. This large outbreak of GAS infection was the first reported in an LTACH, a setting that contains a highly susceptible patient population. Widespread infection control lapses likely allowed continued transmission. Similar to the situation in other care settings, appropriate infection control and case cohorting may help prevent and control outbreaks of GAS infection in LTACHs.
Invasive group A streptococcal (GAS) infections, such as cellulitis, pneumonia, necrotizing fasciitis, and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome, result in 9000-11,000 cases and 1000-1900 deaths each year in the United States [1] . Although the majority of invasive GAS infections are sporadic and community-based, potentially preventable severe GAS infections occur among patients in acute care hospitals and residents in long-term care facilities (LTCFs). Clusters of nosocomial GAS infections have been found among postpartum and postsurgical patients, often because of a health care provider colonized with GAS [2] . In the United States, LTCF residents are at increased risk of acquiring invasive GAS infection because of older age and the presence of underlying medical conditions known to increase the risk of invasive GAS disease, such as heart disease, diabetes mellitus, and loss of skin integrity [1] . Crowded living conditions, an established risk factor for invasive GAS infection, are also characteristic of many LTCFs [3] [4] [5] .
Over the past 20 years, an increasing number of patients have required a high level of medical care for weeks to months after hospital discharge. Institutions that provide such extended highlevel care include long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) and skilled nursing homes and inpatient rehabilitation facilities, both of which generally have lower levels of acuity than do LTACHs [6] [7] [8] . In recent years, the number of LTACHs in the United States has increased dramatically, from 105 facilities in 1993 to nearly 400 in 2007 [9] . These specialty hospitals provide care to patients with chronic, complex medical conditions requiring skilled, intensive medical care for a mean duration of >25 days [8] . Medical conditions requiring LTACH-level care include post-surgical wounds, traumatic brain injury, and musculoskeletal disorders necessitating comprehensive rehabilitation. LTACH patients often have substantial loss of skin integrity resulting from surgery or decubitus ulcers. LTACHs are certified by Medicare as long-term care hospitals and are licensed as acute care or specialty care hospitals with The Joint Commission.
In January 2008, a private clinical laboratory contacted the New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) Scientific Laboratory Division to ask for assistance performing pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) on a cluster of GAS isolates from clinical specimens in response to a request from an LTACH physician. NMDOH identified 5 patients in the LTACH who had invasive GAS infection during January and 3 case patients in the preceding October and November.
Epidemiologists from NMDOH and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted an intensive onsite investigation. The objectives were to determine the extent of invasive GAS in the LTACH, identify risk factors for GAS infection among patients, and make recommendations to prevent future infections. We describe here the epidemiologic investigation and laboratory findings. This is the first published report describing an outbreak of GAS infection in an LTACH.
METHODS

Case Definition and Case Finding
We defined a case as illness in a patient residing in the LTACH at some period between 1 October 2007 and 3 February 2008 with GAS isolated from culture and with symptoms of GAS infection. We further defined a confirmed case as illness in a patient from whom GAS was isolated from a normally sterile site (eg, blood). A probable case was illness in a patient with GAS isolated from a nonsterile site (eg, wound or sputum) and a clinical syndrome consistent with GAS infection (eg, cellulitis and pharyngitis) when GAS was the predominant bacteria isolated. We included only case patients for whom the date of positive culture result or symptom onset occurred >48 h after LTACH admission to exclude infections acquired outside the LTACH.
To identify additional cases, we reviewed all medical records and laboratory reports of patients in the LTACH. Active surveillance was implemented from 31 January 2008 to 3 months after the last identified case and included collection of blood samples and other relevant specimens from patients with signs or symptoms of infection. A standardized data-abstraction form was used to obtain demographic and clinical information about each case patient. We documented whether identified case patients received contact precautions and were appropriately cohorted.
Case-Control Study
We conducted a case-control study to determine risk factors associated with GAS infection, including confirmed and probable cases. We sought to identify 4 control subjects for each case patient. Control subjects were randomly selected from among patients who were in the LTACH during the study period but with no cultures positive for GAS or evidence of illness consistent with GAS infection within 3 days before or after the collection date of a case patient's culture positive for GAS or symptom onset. Persons identified as case patients at any time during the study period were excluded as control subjects. We used a standardized data-abstraction form to obtain demographic information, room assignments, medical and surgical histories, functional status (ambulation, feeding, and continence), wound care history, presence of nonsurgical loss of skin integrity, and any recent (after 1 October 2007) surgical procedure.
Carriage Study
We screened for GAS colonization among patients and health care personnel with direct patient care duties. We defined a carrier as a patient or health care worker with GAS cultured from a non-sterile site and no clinical evidence of infection at the time of culture. Among patients, we swabbed the oropharynx and all skin lesions, including gastrostomy, jejunostomy, tracheostomy, and central line sites. Specimens from health care personnel were obtained from the oropharynx and lesions on exposed skin (ie, on the hands or face).
GAS Isolate Characterization
All specimens were sent to SED Medical Laboratories in New Mexico for GAS culture. GAS isolates were analyzed for relatedness by PFGE at the State Public Health Laboratory and were then sent to the CDC for emm subtyping and susceptibility testing using standard methods [10] .
Assessment of Infection Control Practices
During the first week of the investigation, CDC and NMDOH personnel observed hand hygiene practices, personal protective equipment use, dressing changes on patients requiring negative pressure wound therapy (the application of negative pressure to a wound to promote healing), respiratory therapy practices,
central line dressing changes, terminal room cleaning (room cleaning after a patient is discharged), infusate preparation and dispensing, and food tray preparation. Health care personnel with direct patient-care responsibilities completed a survey about duty locations, shift hours, and job responsibilities. The survey included questions about recent illnesses affecting the health care worker and his or her family.
We obtained room logs of case patients and mapped room assignments of case patients and their roommates during the outbreak period. For health care personnel identified as carriers, we reviewed staffing assignments during the outbreak period.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using SAS, version 9.1 (SAS Institute). Categorical variables were analyzed using v 2 statistics and Fisher's exact test. We used logistic regression analysis to identify risk factors for infection, checking for 2-way interactions and collinearity. For multivariable analysis, all variables potentially associated with GAS infection in univariable analysis (P ,.15) were included in our model. We considered P ,.05 to be statistically significant.
RESULTS
Description of the LTACH
The LTACH is a 57-bed facility consisting of a special care unit and 2 medical/surgical units ( Figure 1 ). The special care unit has 6 single-occupancy rooms with intensive care unit beds. Figure 2 ).
The attack rate was 6.9%. Among those with invasive GAS infection, 2 (25%) of 8 died. Review of microbiology laboratory data identified no additional GAS cases in the prior 12 months, and no LTACH residents were identified as having GAS infection within 48 h after admission or transfer to the facility. One case patient was symptomatic at the time of discharge from the LTACH and had subsequent GAS-positive blood and wound cultures matching the outbreak strain. All case patients were located in the medical/surgical units.
Case-Control Study
We included all 11 case patients and 39 control subjects. In univariable analysis, case patients were more likely than control subjects to have had a roommate with GAS infection or colonization and to have received negative pressure therapy for wounds ( Table 2 ). All case patients and control subjects had at least 1 underlying medical condition; there were no statistically significant differences among frequencies of any specific condition. Case patients were significantly more likely to have undergone surgical wound debridement ( Carriage Study GAS was isolated from 8 (17%) of 47 patients without symptoms of GAS infection and 3 (1.6%) of 188 health care personnel with direct patient-care responsibilities. From patients, GAS was cultured from the oropharynx (n 5 1), abdominal wounds (n 5 3), gastrostomy sites (n 5 2), foot/ankle decubiti (n 5 2), and sacral decubitus (n 5 1). All patient carriers resided in the medical/ surgical units. Every GAS-positive culture from health care personnel was from the oropharynx. Two health care providers with positive GAS culture results worked only in the medical/surgical units; the third health care worker carrier also worked in the Figure 1 . LTACH description.
special care unit but was colonized with a strain different from the outbreak strain.
GAS Strain Characterization
GAS isolates from all case patients, patient carriers, and 2 of 3 health care personnel carriers were indistinguishable by PFGE and were emm subtype 76.0. The GAS isolate from the third health care worker carrier yielded a nonmatching PFGE pattern and was emm subtype 77.0. All 8 case isolates available for antibiotic susceptibility testing were susceptible to macrolides and b-lactams and resistant to tetracycline.
Facility Observations
Observed lapses in infection control practices were widespread. Health care personnel did not consistently perform hand hygiene when entering and leaving patient rooms. Although alcohol hand sanitizers were available outside every room, most rooms did not have a separate sink located outside the toilet area; sinks for staff use were located at the ends of corridors. Some health care personnel did not maintain a sterile field when performing central line dressing changes. In double-occupancy rooms, patient-specific stethoscopes were hung from television monitors so that they were touching. Shared medical equipment, including bed boards and blood pressure cuffs, were not cleaned and disinfected between uses. Medical charts did not clearly indicate when a patient was receiving isolation precautions, and isolation precaution signs were not posted uniformly. Room assignments for case patients changed a median of 4 times (range, 1-10) during January and before our investigation. On 4 occasions, a patient without GAS infection was placed in a room with a GAS-infected patient. Three (75%) of these patients subsequently became case patients; the fourth became a carrier. None of these patients died.
Surveys were administered to 197 (83%) of 238 LTACH staff. During the study period, 48% reported having sore throat, fever, cough, or other symptoms of respiratory infection; only 35% of symptomatic staff reported taking sick leave.
One of the 2 health care workers carrying the outbreak strain had contact with case patients but was not more likely to care for case patients than for control subjects (OR, 1.1; 95% CI, 0.3-4.2); the second health care worker carrying the outbreak strain had no known case patient contact.
Control Measures and Interventions
Outbreak control measures included infection control and hand hygiene classes for health care personnel with direct patient contact and regular audits to ensure compliance; reinforcement of standard precautions; rapid implementation of contact precautions after patients were identified as case patient with GAS infection or GAS carriers; use of dedicated patient equipment when possible or adequate cleaning and disinfection between use; active surveillance for 3 months after the last identified case; and rapid treatment of patients and health care personnel identified as case patients or carriers. A visitor wellness policy was implemented; visitors with sore throat, fever, or cough within 48 h before visiting or with exposed and open skin lesions were not permitted to enter the LTACH. Control measures also included voluntary suspension of new admissions during 1-26 February 2008. Because of the lack of single-occupancy rooms, we recommended cohorting case patients and carriers in double-occupancy rooms. This did not always occur. Several patients were already cohorted for other infections (eg, Clostridium difficile or infection due to multidrug-resistant organisms). The facility also lacked complete understanding of the cohorting process; infected or colonized patients placed in the same double-occupancy room were not consistently assigned a designated health care worker. Appropriate cohorting was instituted after additional education by CDC and NMDOH personnel. Carriers were treated with antibiotic therapy (benzathine penicillin G plus rifampin for 4 days, clindamycin for 10 days, or azithromycin for 5 days) for GAS eradication and had additional culture performed 2 weeks after completion of treatment [2] . No carriers remained colonized after a single course of antibiotics. Colonized health care personnel were prohibited from working at the LTACH until 48 h after antibiotic initiation.
After control measures were fully implemented, no additional case patients or carriers were identified.
DISCUSSION
This is, to our knowledge, the first description of an outbreak of GAS infection in a LTACH and one of the largest outbreaks of GAS infection in any single health care facility. The extent of this outbreak and the case-fatality rate of 25% among patients with invasive disease residing in a type of health care facility increasingly used in the United States should alert providers and public health personnel to the risk of serious preventable illness among this very vulnerable population.
In our investigation, the single risk factor remaining significantly associated with GAS infection in multivariable analysis was having a roommate infected or colonized with GAS, a known risk factor for acquiring GAS disease among LTCF residents [11] . GAS is transmitted by contact with secretions from the nose or throat of infected or colonized persons or through direct contact with infected or colonized skin lesions. In this outbreak, disease may have been transmitted through direct contact between roommates or by contact with an infected or colonized health care worker. Our investigation found that GAS-infected and uninfected patients sharing a doubleoccupancy room was linked to subsequent GAS infection in 3 patients and colonization in another. Although we cannot prove that colonization of 1 patient preceded the infection of the roommate because our colonization study was performed at 1 time, it is a plausible theory.
Only 55% of case patients were documented to have a roommate infected or colonized with GAS, suggesting that GAS acquisition was multifactorial.Although negative pressure therapy and wound debridement were identified as risk factors only in univariate analysis, these findings should not be ignored. Nonintact skin is a well-established risk for severe GAS infection [1, 12] . Lack of association in multivariable analysis may be attributable to small sample sizes or the prevalence of these risk factors among control subjects. Negative pressure therapy was statistically associated with GAS wound infections in a cohort study conducted during an outbreak of GAS infection in a wound clinic; 4 (50%) of 8 patients treated with negative pressure wound therapy developed GAS wound infection, compared with 0 of 38 patients not treated with negative pressure wound therapy (P , .0001) (K Gershman, unpublished data). The nonsignificant association in our investigation may be because negative pressure therapy is simply a marker for more extensive wounds or because of increased exposure to infected or colonized health care personnel via wound care. Another hypothesis is that negative pressure therapy might result in preferential growth of organisms that normally colonize the skin. We did not identify negative pressure therapy equipment being shared between patients. All isolates from patients with GAS infection and those from 2 of 3 colonized health care personnel were subtype emm76.0, suggesting that 1 GAS strain was circulating throughout the LTACH. However, data collected via CDC's Active Bacterial Core surveillance identified emm76.0 as the second most common emm subtype in New Mexico during 2008 [13] . Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that GAS was introduced in the LTACH on .1 occasion. Although we could not determine whether the outbreak was initiated by an infected or colonized health care worker or patient or how long the health care personnel identified as carriers were colonized with GAS, the fact that health care personnel were colonized with the outbreak strain and that the outbreak did not end until infection control practices were substantially improved emphasizes the importance of upholding standard infection control practices. Such control measures include timely and appropriate treatment of health care personnel identified as carriers when there is evidence of ongoing transmission in a facility.
Prior investigations of outbreaks of GAS infection in LTCFs support the hypothesis that health care personnel may initiate or propagate outbreaks of GAS infection and that suboptimal infection control practices are important contributing factors [14] [15] [16] [17] . An infection control lapse particular to this large outbreak was placing GAS-infected patients with roommates who were not infected or colonized. Also, GAS-infected patients were frequently moved from room to room, likely facilitating transmission throughout the facility. Because colonization with pathogens including multidrug-resistant organisms is common among LTACHs [8] , isolation and cohorting patients when single-patient rooms are not available is logistically difficult. For this reason, efforts should be made to design facilities with single-patient rooms with easy access to sinks designated for staff use and alcohol-based hand gel dispensers, which reduce health care-associated infections related to contact transmission [18] . The lapses in infection control practices observed in this outbreak, although widespread, were probably underestimated; when the investigation was conducted, the staff was aware of both the outbreak of GAS infection and ongoing surveillance.
Multiple cases in this LTACH occurred over several weeks before outbreak recognition. Similar to published reports of outbreaks of GAS infection in LTCFs, this lack of recognition increased the likelihood of continued disease transmission. In addition, patients in LTACHs are at increased risk for invasive GAS infection and other infections because of the presence of both underlying chronic medical conditions and non-intact skin. Therefore, even 1 case of GAS infection should initiate an investigation for additional cases and a critical assessment of the facility's current infection control practices.
In summary, we describe an outbreak of GAS infection with substantial morbidity and mortality. Future studies may help determine whether risk factors for infection and colonization include negative pressure therapy. LTACH patients with GAS infection should receive contact precautions and be moved to a single-patient room or appropriately cohorted if single-patient rooms are not available. A single health care-associated GAS infection should prompt an epidemiological investigation. GAS carriers among both patients and staff should be identified and treated to prevent further transmission. LTACHs are a unique setting, and more research is needed on infection prevention in this challenging patient population.
